Thursday, September 04, 2008

10 Critical Questions for the GRP, MILF and the Media on Future Choices between War and Peace: Philippine Human Rights Reporting Project

1. The initialled Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was to be formally signed in Malaysia and witnessed by the international community –indicating it was approved and supported by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) at the highest level. Yet Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera reportedly testified to the Supreme Court on Friday that the President had not seen the MOA-AD in "its final form."

This surely suggests political incompetence at the highest level since in theory under international law, it allows Malaysia to force a Constitutional change in the Philippines (to implement the MOA-AD) over something that the government authorized – but not apparently read. What is the GRP response and will it allow a Senate investigation of the whole MOA-AD negation process –or should we wait for the movie?

2. Is the GRP's latest reported decision not to sign now a result of killings and atrocities of civilians allegedly committed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) –or because of concerns with the agreement itself? If the latter, why was it ever initialled and scheduled for signing?

3. The collapse of the MOA-AD process on the eve of its signing and successive confusion has seriously damaged the reputation of the GRP as a reliable negotiator –how can this be repaired?

4. The MOA-AD was the product of four years and eight months of negotiation. Both sides maintain they held full consultations with stakeholders –the GRP through meetings with communities, groups and politicians including those affected by proposed territorial changes – and the MILF likewise and with in particular, the indigenous peoples. Will both sides publish details of those consultations?

5. The GRP is now proposing to focus on a strategy of Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) –but these processes typically take place only within part of an overall agreement or process. If the MOA-AD has been abandoned, what is the government's new plan, if any?

6. The MILF maintains that the initialling of a peace agreement is binding under International Law. At the same time, it refuses to acknowledge that several MILF commanders may have broken international humanitarian law and deliberately targeted civilians, burnt their homes, taken them hostage and killed men, women and children. How can the MILF leadership inspire public confidence that it is a disciplined organization and a prospective partner in peace and will not employ or return to terror tactics if ever frustrated in the future?

7. The MILF states it is not fighting for itself –but on behalf of all the Bangsamoro people. What concrete plans does it have to live up to this promise? Specifically what protection and rights will it afford non-Moro minorities under a future Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)?

8. The MILF publicly refer to the MOA-AD as a Framework Agreement – that is only the context of a future final and detailed agreement which has yet to be thrashed out, agreed and then put to a public vote. Likewise it has publicly called the BJE concept as a sub-state – not as a state within a state. According to the MILF, the BJE will not issue its own currency; pursue international diplomacy or be responsible for its own defense – the three things that commonly define separatism. Should the media start using these terms and hold the MILF to them in the future to help ensure clarity and avoid misunderstanding and misinterpretation?

9. What role -- if any – can the media play in helping negotiate a way out of this dangerous impasse? Alongside its traditional role of informing, educating and acting as a check and balance – can the media play a role as honest broker and impromptu mediator in getting the sides back together?

10. What practical things can both the GRP and the MILF offer in terms of showing good faith and building public confidence back to where it should be?

And finally, an 11th question might even be: Were the authorized GRP MOA-AD negotiators in fact the governmental equivalents of MILF commanders Kato and Bravo –i.e. political renegades – or is the government itself a political renegade writ large given its handling of the whole affair? (Alan Davis, Philippine Human Rights Reporting Project)

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