Row continues over alleged US military bases in South RP

Manila, Philippines (AKI / Oct. 3, 2008) – The alleged presence of US military bases on the conflict-ridden island of Mindanao is continuing to spark heated debate, with left-wing activists accusing the government of covering up the truth.

The Philippines constitution bars foreign military bases, troops, or facilities unless the Senate ratifies a special treaty.

The latest round of allegations followed a fact-finding mission to Zamboanga City by Senate defence committee chairman Rodolfo Biazon on Thursday.

After the visit, Biazon claimed that “there are no US bases in the South.”

A broad anti-war coalition of over 60 organisations reacted by calling Biazon's comments "lame" and the group of senators "biased" or "ignorant."

"This is clearly a case of feigned ignorance at best or a deliberate cover-up at worst," Mitzi Chan, a spokesperson for the Stop the War Coalition-Philippines said on Friday.

"The senators are either blinded by their ideological preference for US bases or by the Philippine military's dependence on US military aid," said Chan.

"Or they are deliberately attempting to cover-up the US bases in order to perpetuate their stay," she added.

Herbert Docena of the international think-tank Focus on the Global South said that Washington has been attempting to transform its global network of military presence to become more agile and less visible.

“If Biazon did not find US bases is because he was looking for the wrong kind,” Docena continued.
“What the US now has in Zamboanga City are military bases of the new, more sophisticated kind. Unlike in the past, these bases hide within local military bases, they don't fly the American flag, they have more austere facilities but are no less of a 'base' in their functions,” he added.

Docena, author of a number of reports on the issue, has been monitoring and researching the US military presence in the Philippines and in the region for the last six years.

Biazon’s mission was prompted by an uproar after that emerged the US government has approved the allocation of a 202 million dollar contract in Mindanao to a private firm that builds and operates US military bases.

The US Defence Department announced on its website on Monday that Texas-based DynCorp International would provide "support services" for the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTP), a special unit under the US Navy operating in Mindanao.

Another Texas-based contractor, Global Contingency Services, constructed facilities for US troops within the Philippine army's Camp Navarro in Zamboanga, Mindanao, last year at a cost of 14.4 million million dollars.

DynCorp, according to its website, builds facilities "in some of the world's most challenging places, including base camps in Iraq" and is also involved "in the operation of complex facilities, including military bases."

After the Philippines Senate voted to boot out US military bases in the country more than a decade ago, the prolonged deployment of American forces has become a contentious issue especially among militant groups.

They are regulated by the Mutual Defence Treaty, which is tied with a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the two countries.

The VFA grants permit of stay to the JSOTP, that officials describe as a "rotating, semi-continuous, semi-permanent presence" of US soldiers in the country.

There are reportedly less than a thousand US troops spread out in Mindanao, Sulu and Basilan. But they have built their own facilities at Camp Navarro, headquarters of the Western Mindanao Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Philippine Marines headquarters at Camp Bautista in Jolo, Sulu.

The Philippines Constitution bars the troops from engaging in direct combat and their official role is to train Filipino soldiers and provide them with intelligence to fight the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group.However, reports indicate they do move as a unit or in the company of Filipino troops in conflict area.

US officials have always denied the existence of military bases in the Philippines or that marines take part in combat operations.

Peace Coaliation Airs Concern Over Kidnap Crisis

The Citizens' Peace Watch, a broad multi-sectoral coalition of NGOs, networks, social movements, and individuals working for peace in the country, expresses its concern for Professor Octavio Dinampo and ABS-CBN journalists Ces Drilon, Jimmy Encarnacion, and Angelo Valderama who have gone missing in Sulu.

Very little is still known about what has happened. And yet, even as the lives of Professor Dinampo and the others are on the line, insinuations about Professor Dinampo's role in this incident has reached our attention. Some security officials seem to be more concerned about blaming rather than saving the victims. At this time when so little is known and yet the danger so clear, these insinuations are malicious, irresponsible, and unfounded.

We have known Professor Dinampo through the years as a respected academic and concerned citizen who has been tirelessly campaigning for peace in Mindanao and in the country. We have heard him speak in educational forums in universities as well as in conferences. We have worked with him in collective campaigns for peace and justice. Just in February this year, Professor Dinampo hosted us, organizations from around the country, in a fact-finding mission to look into the escalation of violence in Sulu. Nothing from our experience leads us to doubt Professor Dinampo's character and integrity.

Though we are not aware of the particular circumstances that led to the current incident, we have reason to believe that Professor Dinampo's alleged role in helping link up the media with alleged Abu Sayyaf leaders could only have been motivated by his desire for truth and dialogue and his conviction that the public -- through the media – deserves to know the entire truth about the situation in his violence-wracked region. So much disinformation surrounds the war in Mindanao and Professor Dinampo – an academic who is very knowledgeable with the local dynamics and personalities in his war-torn land – has persevered to change that.

Knowing this, we strongly doubt whether Professor Dinampo would do anything that would compromise anyone's safety or be involved in any action that would undermine our shared vision of peace.

As an advocate of peace, Professor Dinampo has spoken against human rights violations and injustices committed in the war. We are afraid that it is for his critical stance that Professor Dinampo is being treated by some in authority as the subject of a dangerous smear campaign rather than as someone who needs help. In this "war on terror" which Professor Dinampo has opposed and of which he has become a casualty, in the climate of impunity that pervades over Sulu, anybody who questions authority is automatically targeted as a "terrorist."

We demand that authorities desist from issuing any unfounded allegations pending a fair and thorough investigation.

We demand that instead of casting unwarranted aspersions on people in danger, authorities should instead focus on finding and saving Professor Dinampo and the ABS-CBN journalists. (Herbert Docena)

What Is U.S. Base Construction Unit Spending P650 Million On In Mindanao?

MANILA, Philippines – As the controversy regarding the actions of US militarytroops in southern Mindanao snowballs, Focus on the Global South, aBangkok-based international research institute that has been monitoring US military actions in the country, raises another question: What is a US base construction unit spending $14.4 million or about Php 650 million on in Mindanao?

In a little-reported development that has come to the attention of the institute, the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) had in June 6, 2007, awarded a six-month $14.4-million contract to a certain “Global Contingency Services LLC” of Irving, Texas for “operations support” for the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).[i]

According to its own website, the NAVFAC is the unit within the US military that is in charge of providing the US Navy with “operating, support, and training bases.” It “manages the planning, design, and construction and provides public works support for US Naval shore installations around the world.” Among their business lines are “bases development” and “contingency engineering.”

The JSOTF-P is the unit established by the US Special Operations Command that has been stationed in the southern Philippines since 2002 and which Focus on the Global South believes has established a new kind of US basing in the country.[ii]

According to the announcement by the Pentagon, the contract awarded to Global Contingency Services LLC includes “all labor, supervision, management, tools, materials, equipment, facilities, transportation,incidental engineering, and other items necessary to provide facilities support services.”

Global Contingency Services LLC is a partnership between DynCorp International, Parsons Global Services, and PWC Logistics. The $14.4 million contract is actually part of a bigger $450-million five-year contract for Global Contingency Services to “provide a full range of world-wide contingency and disaster-response services, including humanitarian assistance and interim or transitional base-operating support services.”

According to DynCorp’s website, this will include “facility operations and maintenance; air operations; port operations; health care; supply and warehousing; galley; housing support; emergency services; security, fire, and rescue; vehicle equipment; and incidental construction.”[iii]

Contingency Response Services LLC describes its work as encompassing“operating forces support,” “community support,” and “base support.”[iv]

According to the Defense Industry Daily publication, the contract also includes “morale, welfare, and recreation support.”[v]
The specific contract for work for the JSOTF-P is expected to be completed in January 2008 but other contracts may follow as part of the $450 million-package.

According to Focus’ research, the JSOTF-P has not only been involved in the Philippine military’s operations in the south, it also represents the new kind of more austere, more low-profile kind of overseas presence that the US has been striving to introduce as part of its comprehensive restructuring of its forward-deployment.

US troops themselves refer to their facility in Sulu as “Advance Operating Base 920.”[vi] They describe their mission as “unconventional warfare” and “counterinsurgency.”[vii] {REFERENCE: Herbert Docena, herbert@focusweb.org}

SOURCES:[i] “Contracts, June 6, 2007,” US Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3532 [ii] For Focus on the Global South’s comprehensive report on theJoint Special Operations Task Force, see Unconventional Warfare: AreUS Special Forces Engaged in an ‘Offensive’ War in the Philippines?[can be downloaded from www.focusweb.org/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=105&func=fileinfo&id=23][iii] Press Release, “DynCorp International and JV Partners Win $450million NAVFAC Contract,” DynCorp International, November 2, 2006,www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=197[iv] “Contingency Response Services,” DynCorp International, www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=204[v] Defense Industry Daily, “$14.4M to help US SOCOM in thePhilippines,” June 8, 2007, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=philippines; Ethan Butterfield, “DynCorp lands $450M NavyContingency Services Deal,” Washington Technology, November 3, 2006;www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/29650-1.htm[vi] T.D. Flack, “Special Operations Force aiding an important ally,”Stars and Stripes, March 10, 2007, http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=43138&archive=true[vii] Col. David Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines:What Would Sun-Tzu Say” Military Review, May-June 2005; Members ofthe 1st Special Forces Group, “The History of the 1st SF Group in thePhilippines: 1957-2002,” Special Warfare, June 2002; C.H. Briscoe,“Why the Philippines: ARSOF’s Expanded Mission in the War onTerror’”, Special Warfare, September 2002

U.S. Troops Establish New Kind Of Base In Southern Philippines: Report

MANILA, Philippines - A Bangkok-based international research organization that has been following the US military in the Philippines today warned that US troops spotted in Mindanao are not only involved in the ongoing warbut that they have also established a new kind of US base in the South.

According to Focus on the Global South, the US troops spotted by theAgence France Press photographer belong to the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), a unit that has been indefinitely stationed insouthern Mindanao since 2002.

Contrary to previous efforts by the US and Philippine governments to portray the troops as participating only in temporary training exercises called the Balikatan, it has since been revealed that this unit has stayed on and maintained its presence in the country for the last six years.

Contradicting claims that they are not involved in the fighting, Focus has gathered pronouncements by US troops themselves who have gone on record to say that their mission in the south is “unconventional warfare” – a US military term that encompasses combat operations.

With the Philippine government not giving a definite exit date, and with US officials stating that this unit – composed of between 100 to 500 troops depending on the season – will stay on as long as they are allowed by the government, it is presumed that it will continue to be based in the Philippines for an indefinite period.

Beyond being involved in the war, Focus draws attention to this unit having effectively established a new kind of basing in the Philippines.

According to Focus’ research, the JSOTF-P’s stationing in the south is a prototype of the new kind of overseas basing that the US has introduced as part of its ongoing effort to realign its global basing structure.

Since 2001, the US – which has more than 700 bases and installations in over 100 countries around the world – has embarked on the most radical realignment of its overseas basing network since World War II.

Part of the changes is the move away from large permanent bases – such as the ones in Subic and Clark – in favor of smaller, more austere, more low profile bases such as the JSOTF-P’s presence in Zamboanga and in other places in southern Mindanao.

In terms of profile and mission, Focus points out that the JSOTF-P is very similar to the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa which was established in Djibouti in western Africa in 2003 and which has been described as a sample of the US austere basing template and the “model for future US military operations.”

Focus believes that the Philippines is one of the “nodes for special operations forces” that former Defense Secretary Donal Rumsfeld himself revealed the Pentagon would establish as part of its changes in Asia.

Focus notes that US troops themselves refer to their base in Jolo as “Advance Operating Base-920.”

(Focus on the Global South’s research on the JSOTF-P, Unconventional Warfare: Are US Special Forces Engaged in an ‘Offensive’ War in the Philippines?, was published earlier this year and can be downloaded for free from: http://www.focusweb.org/index.php? option=com_remository&Itemid=105&func=startdown&id=23)

REFERENCE:Herbert Docena, Research Associate, Focus on the Global South

SPECIAL: Aussie Posse Gunning For Gloria's Foes

MANILA - In December 2003, Prime Minister John Howard provoked criticism and protests around the region when he said that his country had the right to launch "pre-emptive strikes" against targets anywhere in Southeast Asia.

In July and August of the following year, Australian special forces and sailors trooped to the Philippines to hold joint training exercises with their Filipino counterparts. [1] Then, in October, 2005, a few months after it was reported that the Australian police were involved in "covert operations" in the country, the Australian press carried reports - subsequently denied by the government - that elite Australian troops had joined their US and Filipino counterparts in operations against alleged terrorists in the southern Philippines. [2]

If a Filipino had - for whatever reason - sued an Australian soldier participating in the above missions, the accused would have been treated in the Philippine justice system like any ordinary foreigner brought to court. With the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) signed by Manila and Canberra last week, however, Australian troops in the country have become no ordinary mates: as with the Philippines' only other such agreement - the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the US, the SOVFA will accord Australian troops a different "status".

This, in essence, is what the agreement with Australia is all about. Though the agreement is expected to be presented to the public in a different light, it is basically a pact that would, to the extent negotiable, exempt Australian troops in the Philippines from being subject to the country's laws.

As Frank Stone of the US's Military Foreign Affairs office explains in a presentation posted on the Pentagon website, "status of forces" agreements (SOFAs) seek to apply the concept of the "Law of the Flag" or the idea that a country deploying military forces abroad should apply its own laws to its soldiers - and not that of the country where they are to be deployed. [3] This is the concept that has driven the US to negotiate a variety of such agreements with over 90 countries since 1951. [4]

The specific provisions of the SOVFA have not been revealed but, just like the VFA, it is expected to spell out in what cases and under what conditions Australian troops could be held legally accountable in the host country, which government will have jurisdiction over them, and who will pay for claims arising from lawsuits.

SOFAs vary because while the party deploying forces will seek to secure the maximum level of privileges for its troops in the host country, it is not always assured of getting everything it wants because host countries could - and have in fact - balked at some demands. While the US, for example, has proposed complete immunity for and jurisdiction over its troops, other governments have only been willing or are able to give only limited rights.

Contrary to how it has been portrayed in some accounts, the SOVFA is not a new security agreement of the sort that binds parties to new defense obligations; it merely governs existing ties. At the same time, however, the agreement is also not just a mere legal or judicial arrangement; its signing has political and geostrategic implications within and beyond the countries involved.

With mates like these

First, it is important to note that the two signatories to the agreement belong to the network of pro-US allies in the Pacific long described by US policy-makers and analysts as an "American lake" and which, after Europe during the Cold War, is now considered the "focus of strategic competition" by neo-conservatives. [5]

If being on the same side in war is to be an indication, Australia is perhaps the US's most reliable ally in the world. No other country - not even Britain - has fought side-by-side the US in all its major wars in the past century. In recent years, it sent sizeable contingents to join the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.

While many other countries have since pulled out, the Australian troops remain part of the dwindling "coalition of the willing". Home to important US military bases and installations and the site of large-scale joint military exercises, Australia has also signed on to plans for developing the US's controversial anti-ballistic missile defense system in the region.

In the network of pro-US allies around the world, Australia stands out for the role it is carving for itself in its own backyard. For his unflinching support for US foreign policy, Howard has been called the "deputy sheriff" to the "global sheriff", President George W Bush.

Having urged Parliament to support his plans for expanding Australia's role in the region, Howard has presided over what the media have observed to be the largest expansion of the Australian military in years, with the new troops intended to be deployed for overseas missions. [6]

Itself a former colonial ruler of neighboring Papua New Guinea, Australia has recently sent troops to East Timor and the Solomon islands, prompting concerns regarding its regional interventions. Its role in policing the region is critical to US military strategy. As the influential American neo-conservative commentator Max Boot has pointed out, "We may be the global sheriff, but we need a posse to be effective, and Australia has been a stalwart member of that self-selected assemblage." [7]

With the US military overstretched, Washington may find more and more reason to share - if not outsource - some tasks to its deputy in Southeast Asia. The signing of the SOVFA signals that Australia is stepping up to the plate. As US troops get bogged down in the Middle East and Central Asia and as critical interests continue to be threatened in the US's own backyard, Latin America, more and more Australian combat boots will tread alongside - if not replace - those of the Americans in the Asia-Pacific.

Old friend

The Philippines under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, on the other hand, is still - despite some very public spats - perhaps the US's most dependable ally in all of Southeast Asia. While most other governments in the region have publicly distanced themselves from Washington, Manila has bucked the trend and has even intensified its military cooperation with the United States since September 11, 2001.

At no point since the closure of its military bases in the country in 1991 has the US established a more visible presence: while Thailand, another close US ally, recently rejected an offer by the US to send troops to its violence-wracked southern provinces, between 300-500 US special forces have been indefinitely stationed in Mindanao since early 2002. Apart from them, a steady stream of US troops take part in up to 24 exercises held all year round in various places in the country. [8]

Under the Mutual Logistics Servicing Agreement with the US signed in 2001, the US is permitted to use military facilities and installations all over the country. Though officials deny that bases have been re-established in the country, the Philippines is listed as hosting "cooperative security locations" - a category of bases - by the Overseas Basing Commission, an official body tasked to review the US's basing abroad. [9]

Government officials and analysts suggest that there's nothing special with the SOVFA since the Philippines plans to sign similar agreements with Association of Southeast Asian countries. The ones with the US and Australia will just be one of many. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Philippines will actually grant non-US allied countries the same privileges as the ones it gives to fellow US allies.

The Pacific posse

If ratified, the SOVFA will further tighten the links between two pro-US allies in the region. By guaranteeing Australia that its troops will be well taken care of in the country, the SOVFA will usher in more Australian military deployments to the Philippines - whether for military exercises or for the kind of missions described by US special forces themselves as "counter-insurgency" or "unconventional warfare" operations in the southern Philippines. Such joint missions among allies will enhance what the military calls "inter-operability" as they share military doctrine, information, techniques and equipment.

In bringing together two close allies in the southwestern rim of the Pacific, the SOVFA will strengthen the chains of the pro-US bloc in the region and reinforce what one analyst calls the "new Pacific wall" [10]. This wall already spans South Korea and Japan to the north, Mongolia to the northwest, Guam in the center and Thailand and Singapore further west.

Incidentally, just six weeks before the signing of the SOVFA, Australia also inked what a report described as a "historic" security pact with Japan, a country that hosts over 90 US military bases and facilities housing over 30,000 US troops. [11] Australia had also earlier joined Japan and the US in forming the so-called Trilateral Security Dialogue in 2002.

While the threat of "terrorism" is often invoked to explain the growing cooperation between allies in the region, this explanation would only be accurate to the extent that so-called "Islamic terrorists" are actually seen as threatening larger and enduring security interests. This does not appear to be the case with groups such as the Abu Sayyaf - the supposed target of US military action in the Philippines - which, despite repeated projections to the contrary, arguably does not have the capacity to be considered a primary threat to US national security.

In contrast, the US's own 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, widely seen as articulating official government thinking, has unequivocally identified China as having "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States" [12]. It is China which the new Pacific wall surrounds.
Without a common enemy

And, as with all alliances, it is on this, on the existence of a perceived common threat, where the pro-US bloc in the region could flounder. While the US under Bush, after vacillating for years on whether to walk the path of engagement or containment, may have now positively identified China as its potential enemy, the Philippines has not - and may not.

It is telling that just as Arroyo was inviting Howard to sign the SOVFA, Filipino generals were holding official talks with Chinese security officials in Manila and getting pledges of US$1.2 million in military engineering equipment from Beijing [13] - a pittance compared to the $96 million they stand to get from the US this year, [14] far from enough to tip the scale of allegiances for now.

But with exports to China growing five-fold between 2001 and 2005 and with investments from China recording a dramatic 122,000% increase between 2001 and 2006, [15] the Philippines' attitude toward its neighbor is now more ambiguous - if not more conciliatory - compared with the time just a decade ago when Manila had a diplomatic row with Beijing over the Spratly Islands.

Whether the Philippines' interests will be served more by being on the side of the US and Australia in a potential confrontation with China is expected to weigh heavily on the minds of the Philippine Senate as its members begin to debate whether or not to ratify the SOVFA.

For it is not China that is on Filipino leaders' minds. Arroyo herself has not been shy in saying that the benefits of closer ties with the mates from Down Under - including 28 high-speed gunboats and about $3.28 million in inducements for signing - will be unleashed on alleged communist rebels and Moro separatists in the south. [16]

Indeed, while the Philippine military consistently claims that the subjects of their foreign-assisted offensives in Mindanao are "al-Qaeda linked" members, it has repeatedly turned out that they have actually been targeting members of a separatist movement that forged a peace agreement with the government in 1996.

Defense Minister Brendan Nelson for his part has stated that Australia will support the Philippine Defense Reform Program, [17] known to be the partly US-drafted and US-funded long-term master-plan of the new drive to finally eradicate the state's internal enemies and which is blamed for the current spate of political killings and other human-rights violations.

For now, as it has been for a long time, the enemy in the minds of the Philippine ruling class and security establishment is within; the alliance, a commercial transaction with the highest bidder.

Notes

1. "Defense Strengthens Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with the Philippines," Australian Government Department of Defense media release, July 4, 2004; "Australia, Philippines to hold navy exercises," Agence France Press, August 19, 2004. 2. Charles Miranda, "Aussies target Philippines terror," The Daily Telegraph, June 20, 2005; "DFA says Aussie anti-terror forces in RP covered by "agreements," The Philippine Star, June 22, 2005; "Elite Australian troops join hunt for JI terrorists in RP," October 11, 2005; Greg Sheridan, "SAS in hunt for Asia's terrorists," The Australian, October 14, 2006. 3. Notes from a presentation delivered by Frank Stone, director of Military Foreign Affairs Office, April 10, 2002, Orlando, Florida. 4. "Status of Forces Agreements."

5. Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000. 6. Phil Mercer, "Australia beefs up military for action overseas," Voice of America, August 24, 2006; Esther Pan, "Australia's Security role in the Pacific," Council on Foreign Relations, June 18, 2006. 7. Max Boot, "Howard's end: Australia's prime minister no longer connects with voters," Weekly Standard, June 4, 2007. 8. "Unconventional warfare: Are US special forces engaged in an 'offensive war' in the Philippines?" Focus on the Global South special report, January 2007. 9. Overseas Basing Commission, report to the president and Congress, August 15, 2005. 10. Conn Hallinan, "The new Pacific wall," (Silver City, NM and Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, May 30, 2007.)11. "Howard signs historic security pact with Japan," ABC News Online, March 13, 2007.

12. Office of the Secretary of Defense (United States), Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, February 6, 2006; see also Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military power of the People's Republic of China 2006: Annual Report to Congress." 13. AHN, "Philippine military to receive $1.2 million in equipment from China," May 27, 2007. 14. Philippines Center for Defense Information. 15. National Statistics Office (Philippines), "Direction of trade: 2001 to 2005"; Philippine Board of Investments, "Total FDI by country, 2001 and 2006."16. Phil Mercer, "Australia, Philippines sign landmark security pact," May 31, 2007, Voice of America; AP, "RP Australia sign security pact allowing joint counterterrorism," May 31, 2007. "Defense official said these will be used against Moro and communist leaders," Christine Avendano, "RP-Aussie war games expected next year," PDI, May 30, 2007. 17. Media release of the Australian Embassy in the Philippines, "Australia and the Philippines strengthen defense ties." (By Herbert Docena, reprinted from the Asia Times Online)

Herbert Docena (herbert@focusweb.org) is a Manila-based researcher with Focus on the Global South (www.focusweb.org), an international policy research and advocacy institute.

Banging the Drums of War!

DAVAO CITY - Mainstream print media's coverage of recent events in Mindanao is manufacturing consent for war.

As Mindanao reels yet again on the brink of another all-out war, sections of mainstream print media may be helping push it closer to the edge.

A quick round-up of their coverage tells us what in their view has been happening: A rogue commander not supported by the rest of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and who is coddling "al-Qaeda linked" Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah members started it all by attacking the military. The military had no choice but to retaliate. Now things are spiraling out of control and it's all the terrorist-coddling rogue commander's fault.

Such a plot may well have been written by the public information office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). But it is precisely how the conflict is being passed off as truth to the public by certain sections of the press. The underlying message is hard to miss: the military are necessarily the "good guys" and they need our unconditional support.

Take for example veteran defense reporter Manny Mogato's dispatch for Reuters on April 17: "Fighting between government forces and rogue Muslim rebels is spreading in the southern Philippines, shattering hopes for peace and threatening local support for a U.S.-backed campaign to flush out militants."[1]

Note that the word "rogue" -- a value-laden adjective synonymous to "rascal" or "scoundrel" according to a thesaurus -- was not enclosed in quotation marks. Editors, usually allergic to the faintest hints of editorializing, apparently let it pass. The word "alleged," a convenient term for attributing a claim to a source, is missing. There is also no indication that the reporter was merely using a word used by the military to describe their adversaries.

The writer himself apparently believes -- and leads his readers to believe -- that the other actors in the conflict are indeed "rogue." In another paragraph, Mogato describes the leader of the "rogue" rebels, Ustadz Habier Malik, as a "renegade" commander -- again, without using quotation marks. The term "renegade" is likewise used without quotation marks by Anthony Vargas of the Manila Times and ABS-CBN's online news.

Reporting for the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Michael Lim Ubac, Christine Avendano, and Julie Alipala wrote: "President Macapagal- Arroyo... yesterday gave free rein to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to pursue Moro terrorists on Jolo island..."[2] Note that the word "terrorist," a highly emotionally charged term, does not have quotation marks around it and there is nothing to suggest that the reporters were merely using Arroyo's word.

It was their own. The headline, "GMA tells AFP: Pursue MNLF rebel," proclaims who they are referring to. They also describe Malik as a commander of a "rogue faction" of the MNLF but without indicating that such a description was bestowed by the government, not something that they found out on their own. If such glaring editorializing was an oversight, there was no erratum the following day.

Alipala, in another Inquirer article published April 25, wrote: "Military clashes against Abu Sayyaf terrorists and their coddlers have triggered fresh evacuation of residents in nine towns on the island." Having reported that the AFP has been running after the MNLF's "rogue faction" because it is accused by the military of coddling the Abu Sayyaf, Alipala and her editors seem to have gone one step farther.

They explicitly accept the military's avowed rationale for the war and inform their readers that yes, indeed, without any doubt, the MNLF has been coddling the Abu Sayyaf and that this is truly the reason why the military is hunting them.

In this case, Alipala outdid even the AFP itself because as late as April 21, AFP Chief Hermogenes Esperon himself was quoted by the Inquirer as saying that they are still "validating" reports about the MNLF linking up with the Abu Sayyaf.[3] If Alipala had other sources of information to support her contention, she did not disclose them.

The above is, with few exceptions, typical: reporters have taken to appropriating the military's explanation in their narrative and to adopting the military's labels and adjectives as their own.[4] Journalists normally attribute claims to their sources and take pains to put quotation marks around their sentences or phrases.

For example, instead of saying, "fighting between government forces and rogue Muslim rebels," one could have, at the very least, said "fighting between government forces and Muslim rebels described as 'rogue' by the military." Or "Moro fighters described as 'terrorists' by the government" instead of "Moro terrorists." (To be fair, one must also ensure that the Moro fighters' own description of the military should also be included.)

But choices are rarely innocent: that attribution has been deemed unnecessary points to just how much the world-views of the military and the reporters covering them have melded.
Another basic journalistic practice, that of allowing the other party to air its side, was, in all of the articles above, casually abandoned. No one bothered to find out what Malik or anyone who could speak for his group had to say.

It was no secret, even then, that the MNLF and other independent sources from Sulu had, from the very beginning, maintained that it was the military's attack on an MNLF camp the previous week, the killing of a Moro youth and other unresolved abuses they blame on the military, and the postponement of the tripartite meeting seven times in a row that, they claim, provoked them to fire back.

There is also no mention that the MNLF has consistently denied allegations that they are sheltering the Abu Sayyaf nor is there any reference to the military's failure to present proof to support its allegation. There is not even a passing mention of the MNLF's claim that, contrary to the AFP's pronouncements, Malik has not been disowned by the group.

There was no mention of all these because those with the MNLF were not even asked. Article after article on the situation lacked the customary "other side". If it was because Malik or anyone who could speak for him couldn't be found -- an unlikely possibility -- there was no mention that "Malik or any other representative from his group could not be reached as of press time." Interestingly, there was a reference to MNLF chairman Nur Misuari supposedly distancing himself from Malik in an ABS-CBN article. But who was the source? Not Misuari himself but a police superintendent. The other side does have a voice; the media allows the military and the police to speak for them. [5]

This is not to say that the MNLF should be given the final word. Beyond presenting both sides, the media is also expected to verify their claims independently because two contradictory sides can't both be true at the same time. But how can the MNLF's claims even be scrutinized when they are not even given the chance to air their side? That reporters ignored the need for balance, an elementary requirement of any news article, not only betrays complete faith in one side's pronouncements and a lack of any interest in finding out the truth.

Such faith is confounding given the military's record of contradiction. That the military has in the past claimed to be pursuing "terrorists" only to backtrack later is documented. In February 2003, for instance, the military adamantly claimed that the target of their offensives was the Pentagon gang in central Mindanao only to publicly admit later that they were actually going after the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) all along.[6]

As early as 2001, National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales had accused the MNLF of getting cozy with the Abu Sayyaf.[7] But up to November last year, when the AFP again claimed to be fighting the MNLF because it was coddling the ASG, Esperon contradicted his own superiors and subordinates by saying that they had no confirmation to back-up their allegation.[8]

When clashes broke out in the past, the military had repeatedly presented itself as the aggrieved party that was only provoked to fire back in response. Such was the case in February and November 2005. It turned out that, according to locals, the former began when a group of soldiers massacred an entire defenseless family in Kapuk Punggul and the latter started when the military knowingly attacked an MNLF camp.

A more systematic and more comprehensive content-analysis of media's reportage could yield interesting findings. But its coverage of recent developments in Mindanao's long-drawn out war is most likely not an aberration. This is not the first time, for example, that the media had adopted the military's labels.

When fighting broke out in November 2005, article after article reported that the military was going after a so-called "Misuari Breakaway Group" -- the name the military gave their enemies at that time -- even when those who were being chased claimed to be with the mainstream of the MNLF and even as no other faction within the MNLF contested their claim.[9] Question: if Juan wants to call himself Juan but Jose wants to call him Pedro, should the media follow Jose and call Juan not Juan but Pedro instead?

The media's coverage of the barbaric beheading of seven construction workers also raises a lot of issues. The Inquirer devoted its front- page banner article discussing the heart-breaking killing of innocent civilians with simple dreams and on how Muslim leaders roundly condemned the crime.[10]

Rightly so. But when was the last time the Inquirer -- or any newspaper for that matter -- devoted a banner article, or even one on the inside pages, on the beheading of innocent Moro youths blamed on the military? When was the last time reporters solicited the Catholic hierarchy's condemnation of Catholics who are accused of beheading Moros? Or are young Moros' dreams worth less in the calculus of newspaper lay-out? Is their religion irrelevant when the killers are Christian?

Interestingly, with the Abu Sayyaf probably mentioned in more news reports these days than any other group or individual, when was the last time a reporter bothered to interview someone from the group? Given that, in Sulu, the Abu Sayyaf seems to be whoever the military claims it to be and given that those who are labeled Abu Sayyaf, being buried six feet under, could no longer contest the military's claims, did the media have any other independent source of information on the beheadings apart from the military?

With all the speculation and the unresolved reports that the Abu Sayyaf is colluding with the military and local warlords, isn't it high time that someone in the media actually tried to find out who they are and what they have to say and why they do the things they reportedly do? Or shouldn't we talk to the "enemies" and just allow the military to be their spokespersons?

Speaking of the Abu Sayyaf, no mention of the group now seems to be complete without the phrase "al-Qaeda linked." News report after news report point out that the Abu Sayyaf is linked to Osama bin Laden's worldwide network and leave it at that -- as though such a claim has once-and-for-all been established and is not to be questioned any longer.[11] Except for the occasional reference to unnamed "intelligence officials," there is often no mention as to who makes the claim and no discussion as to the bases of their claims.

We are never told that such a claim -- which is central to the rationale for the "war on terror" -- is hardly undisputed. In fact, even the Arroyo government is on record as saying that such a connection has not been adequately proven and the US Congressional Research Service has pointed out that the government's claims are conflicting.[12] Other researchers have raised a lot of unanswered questions over the allegation.

If they are unable to go to the bottom of things, then, at the very least, reporters could add a cautionary line or two saying that the 'al-Qaeda-linked' claim is still the subject of an ongoing debate. Such a disclaimer is rarely found. The phrase "al-Qaeda-linked" has become a permanent, self-perpetuating fixture that is questioned by no one and repeated by everyone.

What explains reporters' cavalier abandonment of the basic tenets of journalism in covering the war? The pressures of the news-cycle? The perils of parachute journalism? What makes among the most skeptical of professions suddenly accept what they are told without any question? Is there an underlying "us versus them" jingoism and prejudice underlying the coverage? Is there a confluence of interests between the military and the reporters "embedded" with them? These issues could be exciting academic questions in the field of media studies.

But it is an academic question only if lives were not on the line. For just as the media played a large part in justifying and rallying public opinion in favor of the invasion of Iraq by their failure -- or refusal -- to look into Bush's claim regarding Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction -- and indeed the New York Times later apologized for this failure, the Philippine media's coverage of developments in the South has been fanning the flames of war.

The unchallenged story-line that the military is purveying and the media is uncritically reporting to the public -- i.e. that a "rogue" faction "coddling terrorists" started it all and that the military are necessarily the "good guys" who can do no wrong and who were left with no other choice -- is precisely what is required to draw public support for aggressive military solutions to the complex problems in the south.

The other possibilities -- that hawkish military commanders backed up by other interests with the material incentives to kill the peace agreement have taken over Arroyo's embattled government, that Moros are being driven to a corner because of the atrocities being committed against them -- will never be explored because they will not make it to the news.

It is not reporters who are dropping bombs in Sulu. But by uncritically covering the war from the perspective of the military, they may be cheering on those who do.

[1] Manny Mogato, "Fighting Spreads in southern Philippines," Reuters, April 17, 2007.
[2] Michael Lim Ubac, Christine O. Avendano, and Julie S. Alipala, "GMA tells AFP: Pursue MNLF rebel," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 18, 2007.
[3] Juliet Labog-Javellana, "Beheadings Outrage GMA, Islamic Scholars," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 21, 2007.
[4] "Palace defends Sulu offensive vs Moro rebels," abs-cbn.com, April 17, 2007; "Beheadings spur AFP to press hunt for Abu Sayyaf," The Manila Times, April 21, 2007; "Sulu fighting uproots more than 40,000: WFP," abs-cbn.com, April 19, 2007.
[5] "Sulu fighting uproots more than 40,000: WFP," abs-cbn.com, April 19, 2007.
[6] Dona Pazzibugan, "MILF, not Pentagon gang, real target, says military," Philippine Daily Inquirer, Feb 17 2003.
[7] "I didn't oust Nur, I was part of the process," Newsbreak, December 5, 2001.
[8] Roel Pareno, "2,000 Sulu folk flee fighting," Philippine Star, November 15, 2005.
[9] See for example Dona Z. Pazzibugan, Julie S. Alipala, Edwin O. Fernandez, Nash Maulana, "New fighting erupts in Jolo," Inquirer News Service, November 17, 2005, www.inq7.net, Sam Mediavilla, Al Jacinto and Anthony Vargas, "Jolo offensive to drag on until Christmas," abs- cbn.com, November 18, 2005.
[10] Julie S. Alipala and Cynthia D. Balana, "Dreams of 2 Zambo Teeners end in Jolo," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 21, 2007.
[11] Julie S. Alipala, "9 soldiers, civilian slain in Army base shooting rampage," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 8, 2007; Julie S. Alipala, "Military probes Sulu misencounter," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 5, 2007; Andrew Marshall, "The Philippines' Unending Guerilla War," Time Magazine, Jan. 25, 2007.
[12] Larry Niksch, "Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti- Terrorism Cooperation," CRS Report for Congress, Jan 25, 2002.(Contributed by Herbert Docena, a researcher with Focus on the Global South, an international policy research and advocacy institute, who has been following the war in Mindanao.)