NPA owns up attack in Mindanao

DAVAO CITY, Philippines (Mindanao Examiner / Mar. 30, 2010) – New People’s Army communist rebels took responsibility Tuesday the killing of six government soldiers in an attack in the southern Philippines.

A rebel spokesman Dyomabuk Kadyawan, of the NPA’s Antonio Nerio Antao Command, said the attackers also seized an M16 rifle from the soldiers. Three more soldiers were wounded in the weekend attack in the village of Mahan-ob in Davao Oriental’s Baganga town, Kadyawan said.

He said the attack sparked a firefight that lasted more than an hour. “The guerilla offensive lasted for at least an hour. Six enemy troops were killed in action while three were wounded. The NPA sustained no casualties. The Red Army recovered an M-16 Armalite rifle,” Kadyawan said.

He said the military bragged about its victory in setting up the so-called Barangay Defense System, which proved vulnerable to rebel attack.

“The guerilla action is a slap on the enemy's face who just recently declared that Baganga in Davao Oriental is said to be NPA-free,” Kadyawan said, adding “the NPA action exposed the fascist enemy's blindness on the NPA presence in the supposedly NPA-free municipality. Despite their BDS, they have no inkling that the NPA unit was just in the vicinity where they were resting on.”

The attack occurred on the eve of the NPA’s 41st anniversary and even after authorities heightened security in areas where rebels are actively operating.

Last week, rebels raided a fruit plantation in the village of Guinhalinan in Surigao del Sur’s Barobo town and destroyed four excavators and two bulldozers owned by a sub-contractor of DOLE Philippines, Inc.

NPA forces also attacked a military detachment in the village of Luz in North Cotabato’s Mlang town and killed a government militia and wounded two more before ransacking an army detachment and seized 35 assorted high powered weapons.

But the military downplayed the attacks and branded them as terrorism.

“For more than four decades now, the New People’s Army celebrates its anniversary founded on greed rationalized by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist creed. No wonder why the lowly NPA rebels in the mountains are fighting a losing war to satisfy the whims and caprices of their leaders who have been enriching only themselves and their families; to the detriment of the NPA rank-and-file, all in the guise of fighting a legitimate cause,” said Colonel Daniel Lucero, Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations of the Philippine Army.

He said the NPA is synonymous to violence and an enemy of Philippine democratic ideals.

“The ordinary Juan dela Cruz now abhors violence as a means to achieving an end and has vowed to stop violence and coercion in pursuing a supposedly genuine aspiration,” Lucero said.

He said the Philippines is dubbed as one of the most democratic countries in Asia.

“It is ironic to see the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army- National Democratic Front still electing to adhere to a system long outdated by evolution and modernity. Other than being a money-making extortion business with an objective aimed at advancing the personal and political ambitions of its leaders, the agenda of the CPP-NPA-NDF are quite dubious,” Lucero said.

The NPA is the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines which has been fighting for decades for the establishment of a Maoist state in the country. (Mindanao Examiner)

NPA rebels torch irrigation equipment in South RP

DAVAO CITY, Philippines (Mindanao Examiner / Mar. 24, 2010) – Communist rebels torched construction equipment used in government irrigation projects in an attack in the southern Filipino province of Agusan del Sur, officials said.

Officials blamed the New People’s Army for the attack which occurred late Tuesday in the village of Angas in Santa Josefa town.

“It is another case of arson perpetrated by the communist rebel group New People’s Army to extort money from uncooperative construction companies in the area. More than three million pesos worth of construction equipment used in the irrigation project undertaken by the National Irrigation Administration was destroyed.”

“This happened even if the project was meant to alleviate the plight of the farmers in the area who are reeling from the effects of the El Nino phenomenon,” said Colonel Daniel Lucero, Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations of the Philippine Army.

Quoting military reports, Lucero said the attackers were led by an NPA leader identified only as Ka Jamal, of the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee. He said the rebels briefly held Rene Amoy, who works for the MarkBuilt Construction Company, and torched the equipment before fleeing to the hills.

“In some areas where the NPA still operates, it is expected that renewed extortion activities will be imposed against companies unwilling to cooperate in the payment of NPA extortion money,” Lucero said. “Rest assured that the Armed Forces of the Philippines will do its duty to safeguard the industries and the people who run them in order to operate their businesses.”

He said the NPA have also resorted in collecting monies from politicians in exchange for a safe passage in areas where rebels are actively operating.

The NPA is the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines which is fighting for decades for the establishment of a Maoist state in the country. (Mindanao Examiner)

SPECIAL: 'Revisiting the military’s Rambo culture' By Colonel Daniel Lucero

The means inside the army’s toolbox should not be just guns and bullets. I was advised by a former field commander—known to be a fighter and now retired—that my present assignment with the Civil-Military Operations (CMO), an approach that utilizes indirect means or non-violent means to resolve insurgency, is only for the weak of heart and unmanly soldiers.

He underscored that effective military leaders are those warrior-type commanders who give more weight to combat operations rather than on CMO, which he stressed is ineffective and futile. He was insistent that combat operation is still the most effective approach to solve this insurgency problem.

This mindset is prevalent in the AFP. Sad to say, the mindset is analogous to the lines of Abraham Maslow who infers that, “If somebody thinks that the only tool he has is a hammer, he tends to see every problem as a nail.” This is how the decision-making attitude of some members of the AFP looks like particularly those who regard themselves as the new Rambo’s. They are canalized within the belief that the only implement that they have is an M16. Needless to say, all problems look like a target to them that should be shot at and obliterated.

This is what I want to argue—that the military mindset, which stresses mainly on combat operations to confront the insurgency problem, is the greatest hindrance why we have not solved this insurgency problem.

The bigger problem, however, is we have not learned a lesson. After 41 years of asserting that we have to give more weight on destroying the enemy, we have not changed our strategy with the fact that the crisis still remains. We have not fully accepted that a bigger part of the solution to this problem is getting the people behind our backs. What then should be blamed in this kind mindset? I would argue that it is because of the kind of culture that some military commanders have developed due to the kind of education, training, and experience that they went through.

Allow me then to prove my argument by first providing a short description on the concepts of culture and strategic culture and what roles do they play in influencing the minds of military commanders. This will be followed by illustrating how some states were able to resolve their insurgency problem and how can we learn from their experiences. The article will conclude by providing some proposals which the government in general and the AFP in particular can put into practice to complement the existing responsive approaches in resolving the insurgency crisis that has been hampering the economic development of our nation.

Question about culture

Does culture matter? Yes indeed! Notable anthropologist Clifford Geertz defines culture as the entire way of life of a society: its values, practices, symbols, institutions, and human relationship.

Evidently, the concept of culture has become a compelling framework to explain the behavior of states, groups, institutions and even individuals. In the field of international politics, the concept of strategic culture has come into the fore to elucidate how different actors view security. This explains the nature of war and how the military views the concern.

A familiar definition of strategic culture characterizes the concept as “a set of attitude and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it”.

Applying these socio-political thoughts in explaining the state of nature of the AFP would elucidate a number of enigmas why the insurgency problem still exists. Studying the strategic culture of the AFP can clarify to us how most military commanders view the nature of our insurgency and how they apply available wherewithal to solve the dilemma.

To start with, the strategic culture of the AFP can be categorically defined as basically conventional. It gives strong emphasis on the annihilation of the enemy just like what Jomini and Clauswitz who both accentuate the massive use of violence to attain a specified political objective.

It is not surprising to note that the conventional strategic culture (i.e., the warrior culture) has been the dominant approach among a great number of military commanders and staff officers of the AFP. Most of them subscribe to the idea that total destruction of the enemy is still the way to go to attain our mandate to solve this insurgency problem.

Just like the Americans and the French—who, because of their experiences during World War I, World War II, and Korean War were captivated by the use of tools of violence during their respective stint in Vietnam—the AFP is also partial in counting firearms confiscated, enemy neutralized, and camps captured with less regard to the political side of the problem.

The military mindset of my former commander that I have stated earlier is the overriding outlook that frustrates the resolute implementation of the CMO approach in confronting insurgency. He, together with those who were captivated by Rambo should look at how the British and their colonial subjects were able to resolve the Malayan insurgency problem.

Malayan experience

The influential book of John A. Nagle entitled “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam”—which became a required reading for the US Special Forces—persuasively argues that the British army in Malaya (1948 to1960) was more of a learning army, which led them to break the communist insurgency problem in their former colony.

The success of the counterinsurgency campaign of the British in Malaya can be greatly attributed to the vision of General Sir Gerald Templer who coined the popular phrase “winning the hearts and minds.”

He led the counterinsurgency campaign bringing with him his vast experiences during the Second World War as a director of intelligence and the political nature of his job. As the High Commissioner in Malaya during the communist insurgency, he was given vast civil and military powers to defeat the political armed rebellion.

According to one of his most quoted lines, “The shooting side of this business is 25 percent of the trouble, the other 75 percent lies in getting the people of this country behind us.”

Templer was indeed ahead of his time. His outlook on the Malayan communist insurgency had served as the guiding principle that led to the resolution of the crisis. Needless to say, the heart of the counterinsurgency effort which was more focused on the political, economic and social had successfully guided both the British Army and its colonial subjects to include those non-military actors.

A different story ensued on the part of the US Army in Vietnam. Despite the fact that the American political leaders recognized and accepted the offer of the British Government to send British military advisors—who were victorious in the counterinsurgency campaign to Malaya—to Vietnam, the latter were ignored by the US military commanders. The British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) was almost completely ineffective in persuading the American military mindset largely because the Americans were not interested in it.

The way ahead

It is an established fact that in order to enable any individual to become effective in handling a particular task, proper and appropriate training and education are the recognized approaches. However, this belief is anchored on the assumption that the individual has the determination to learn and put behind the practices which are proven to be ineffective and futile in achieving one’s objectives.

This principle can explain vividly the counterinsurgency enigma that the AFP is facing. It has been forty-one years since the army has been fighting the communist insurgency. The question lies on the ethos of the army to accept errors and be ready to accept new concepts to correct them. It is then high time for the army to change its strategy just like what the British did during the Malayan campaign.

During the initial stage of the Malayan campaign, the British also indiscriminately applied force in a search-and-destroy strategy using inaccurate and comprehensive intelligence which, in the end, just alienated the soldiers from the people. As such, using more troops with the wrong strategy simply means alienation, more insurgents, hitherto call for more troops. This approach fits into the view of Robert Thompson who notes that “when the strategy is wrong, doubling the effort only squares the error”. The British as a learning army was quick to adjust their strategy as it recognized Templar’s wisdom.

All said, it is then imperative for the AFP to change its operational culture. Fighting a war against an invading army is very much different from confronting the insurgents who are Filipinos - our own people. The conventional mindset of using an overwhelming force to annihilate an enemy has been seen to be futile in the counterinsurgency campaign against the communists.

The use of force without due regard to the sensitivity of the people would create more insurgents and will further alienate the army from the people. Needless to say, the Malayan counterinsurgency campaign’s formula of “winning the hearts and minds” still stands and offers keys to unravel this four-decade security dilemma. It is therefore prudent to recommend the following schemes and processes:

Our national leadership to assign an overall head who will orchestrate and control all counterinsurgency efforts of the government who are involved both in the use of the soft and hard powers of the state; Optimize the utilization of former communist rebels in tactically, ideologically, and doctrinally advising all government agents involved in counterinsurgency;

Give primacy to attract the insurgents to join the mainstream of society than planning to neutralize them through the use of violent means; Reorient the military mindset of army officers which would pave the way for more openness, willingness to listen, and foster intellectual curiosity that would allow everyone’s voice to be heard before decisions are made;

Emphasize to all military commanders that all military actions should first and foremost support political and civil affairs objectives; Emphasize to all stakeholders of Philippine democracy that the insurgency problem that the nation is facing is a political war rather than a military one;

Emphasize to all political leaders that the solution the insurgency problem is heavily reliant on their unwavering support and selfless programs than through the use of military means alone; and Deconstruct the existing dominant warrior ethos in the army and create a compassionate mindset which gives emphasis on the principles of social contract with the people – regardless of their political leanings - which the army has sworn to protect. This suggests the reorientation of the existing education and training programs of the AFP.

Everyone in the army has been aspiring for peace and progress. However, this aspiration will just stay as a delusion if we insist to maintain a military culture that has been proven to be unresponsive, swayed with a false optimism that the outcome will change despite our assertion. The means inside the army’s toolbox should not be just guns and bullets. (First published in Newsbreak Magazine - newsbreak.com.ph)

(ABOUT THE AUTHOR. Colonel Daniel A. Lucero is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations, G7, Philippine Army. He received his Master of Arts degree in International Relations from the Australian National University. In 2001, he led the 18th Infantry Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, Philippine Army, then deployed in Basilan province to its first ever Philippine Army Streamer Award. He is a member of Philippine Military Academy Class ’83.)

Philippine Army Confirms Alliance Between Muslim And Communist Rebels In Mindanao

MANILA, Philippines (Mindanao Examiner / August 27, 2008) – The Philippine Army on Wednesday confirmed government reports that Muslim rebels and have forged an alliance with communist insurgents in Mindanao, where security forces are battling the guerrillas.

Colonel Daniel Lucero, commander of the Army’s Civil-Military Operations, said the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the outlawed New People’s Army have forged a formal alliance as early as in 1999.

“In fact, an informal agreement has been in existence since the late 1980’s. The formal link between the NDF, represented by the Mindanao Commission, and the MILF was forged in 1999. The written agreement covers, among others, exchange of information, sharing of training, manufacture of arms and ammunition - particularly rocket-propelled grenades,” Lucero said, referring to the National Democratic Front, the political wing of the NPA and the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Lucero said this explains why the Mindanao-based NPA rebels were reported to have used anti-tank rockets, loaned by the MILF, in battling government soldiers. He said there were many occasions that MILF forces had disrupted military operations against the NPA in the past.

“Government troops had monitored, in many occasions that MILF forces had been utilized to act as blocking force to NPA’s terror offensives, particularly in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato and South Cotabato,” he said.

He said the MILF, which authorities also linked to the Indonesian terror group Jemaah Islamiya, also provided sanctuary and refuge to communist insurgents who were fleeing government offensives in Mindanao.

“What is more revealing in this alliance is the deafening silence and refusal of the CPP-NPA-NDF and its allied organizations to condemn the terror acts perpetrated by the MILF rebels (in recent attacks in Mindanao),” he said.

The MILF, which is fighting for a separate Muslim homeland, admitted forging an alliance with the NPA, which has been waging a secessionist war for decades for the establishment of a Maoist state in the Philippines. Manila has said the two rebel groups have forged an alliance and that the communist rebels were financing and proving arms and automatic weapons to the MILF.

Communist rebels broke off peace talks with the Arroyo government in 2004 after accusing Manila of reneging on its commitments to free all political prisoners and to put a stop to political killings, among others.

The United States and the European Union on Manila's prodding listed the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA, including its political arm, the National Democratic Front, as foreign terrorist organizations and froze their assets abroad. (Mindanao Examiner)